

similarities in service and sacrifice, that is one area where the Commandant of the Coast Guard is distinct from his peers.

Current law allows that the chiefs of the other services; Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, may provide personal considerations to members of Congress if requested to do so (10 U.S.C. 151(f)); however, the Coast Guard Commandant does not have this privilege. The advice received from the other service chiefs has been invaluable in ensuring that Congress provides the proper resources and legislative support. At a time when the Coast Guard is engaged a wide range of military operations abroad and homeland defense missions at home, that advice is even more important.

It is for that reason, that I am introducing this simple legislation. The bill, first brought to my attention by the Fleet Reserve Association, would give the Commandant of the Coast Guard the authority to make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Coast Guard as the Commandant considers appropriate. It does not mandate unsolicited recommendations, nor dictate the nature of those recommendations. Instead it simply provides the Commandant of the Coast Guard the same authority provided to the heads of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. I would encourage my colleagues to join me in supporting this legislation to ensure that the Coast Guard remains true to its motto—Semper Paratus—or Always Ready.

#### PERSONAL EXPLANATION

#### HON. ELTON GALLEGLY

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, October 28, 2003*

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Speaker, on Monday, October 20, I was unable to vote on H. Res. 356, expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the man-made famine that occurred in the Ukraine in 1932–33 (rollcall 563); H. Res. 400, honoring the 25th anniversary of Pope John Paul II's ascension to the papacy (rollcall 564); and H.R. 3288, to amend title XXI of the Social Security Act to make technical corrections with respect to the definition of qualifying State (rollcall 565). Had I been present, I would have voted "yes" on all three measures.

#### APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO NORTH KOREA ENTAILS MULTILATERAL APPROACH, AVOIDING CYCLE OF EXTORTION

#### HON. DOUG BEREUTER

OF NEBRASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, October 28, 2003*

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member commends to his colleagues two editorials on North Korea.

First, this Member hopes his colleagues will review the October 20, 2003, editorial from the New York Times in which the newspaper finally is willing to call the acts in which North Korea has been engaged "blackmail." Indeed, for many years, this term has accurately described the conduct of the previous Kim II Sung regime and now the Kim Jong II regime.

An agreement by the United States, Russia, China, South Korea, and Japan that there would be no attack on North Korea "in exchange for its commitment to dismantle its nuclear weapons programs" is a sufficient quid pro quo as long as North Korea's acceptance of this proposed agreement is not tied to economic aid. This Member feels very strongly that the United States cannot fall into a cycle of extortion again.

Second, this Member commends the editorial which was published in the October 21, 2003, Los Angeles Times. As the editorial correctly notes, North Korea poses a regional threat and therefore its neighbors—China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan—must be included in all efforts to craft and verify agreements whereby North Korea will dismantle its nuclear weapons program.

[From the New York Times, Oct. 21, 2003]

#### TRYING DIPLOMACY ON NORTH KOREA

President Bush is now taking a wiser and more sophisticated approach to the crisis caused by North Korea's reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons. In a proposal whose details are still being refined, Washington and four other nations would guarantee not to attack the North in exchange for its commitment to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.

This proposal makes an eventual peaceful, diplomatic solution to this extremely dangerous problem somewhat more likely. Just how likely is impossible to tell because there is no assurance that North Korea's highly unpredictable leaders will agree to disarm. If the North does spurn this reasonable offer, Washington will find it easier to persuade Asian nations to support more coercive steps, like international economic sanctions.

North Korea's nuclear programs are particularly alarming because the nation has a long history of selling advanced weapons to all who will pay for them, including other rogue states and perhaps terrorists. Yet in the past year, as the North has raced ahead with reprocessing plutonium into bomb fuel, Washington has handicapped its own efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution by refusing to specify what America would be willing to do if the North firmly committed to giving up its nuclear weapons ambitions in ways outsiders could reliably verify.

The White House had insisted that specifying any such quid pro quo would be giving in to North Korean nuclear blackmail. Blackmail is a fair description of North Korea's behavior. But in a situation in which everyone agrees that military action against the North would have catastrophic consequences for hundreds of thousands of innocent South Koreans and Japanese, Washington's principled stand poorly served American interests.

With this proposal, Mr. Bush is now making a serious effort to revive negotiations and is personally seeking the support of his fellow leaders at the Asia-Pacific summit meeting in Bangkok. All four of the nations that would join Washington in the proposed security guarantee—China, Japan, Russia and South Korea—are represented there. Washington's new approach deserves strong support from each of them.

In offering security guarantees to the North, Mr. Bush wisely overruled hawkish administration officials who preferred moving directly toward coercive economic and military steps. This initiative comes less than a week after the administration's skilled diplomacy won unanimous backing for a United Nations Security Council resolution on Iraq that broadly endorsed Washington's policies there. Diplomacy is an important tool for advancing America's national security. It is good to see it.

[From the Los Angeles Times, Oct. 21, 2003]

#### CORRECT NUCLEAR STRATEGY

President Bush's announced willingness to take part in a joint guarantee not to attack North Korea is an important maneuver in getting Pyongyang to end its nuclear weapons program. Even if Kim Jong Il's regime refuses to accept anything short of a full-fledged treaty, Bush's more conciliatory approach should win needed diplomatic support from China and South Korea.

Bush took advantage of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Bangkok to discuss North Korea's nuclear ambitions with Presidents Hu Jintao of China and Roh Moo Hyun of South Korea. In August, both countries joined the U.S., Japan and Russia to present a united front, urging North Korea to end its atomic weapons development. The U.S. is correct to enlist the assistance of North Korea's neighbors; nuclear proliferation is a regional threat, not an issue of concern only to Pyongyang and Washington.

When North Korea resisted further talks, China and South Korea urged Washington to try to woo the North back to the table by providing written, not just oral, assurance that it would not attack. Bush offered to take that extra step, although he correctly ruled out a formal treaty. Pyongyang's refusal to abide by its 1994 agreement with the U.S. to freeze its nuclear weapons program in exchange for energy supplies and economic aid raises doubts it would live up to a treaty. North Korea first should be required to show international inspectors that it is not reprocessing plutonium and enriching uranium.

One administration official said the U.S. was willing to sign an agreement saying it had no "hostile intent" if North Korea demonstrated that it was making "verifiable progress" in dismantling its weapons program. That's an important change from administration insistence that Pyongyang end the program before getting any economic help. The North considered such an ultimatum unacceptable, but it might end the program in stages if it saw rewards at each step.

North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty last year and keeps saying it is reprocessing plutonium from 8,000 fuel rods. That may be bluff and bluster, but if true it would produce enough fuel for perhaps 20 nuclear weapons. Monday, it fired a conventional missile into the Sea of Japan in a test timed to coincide with the Bangkok summit, though not with Bush's initiative. Pyongyang has sold missiles to other nations; because it is desperately poor and periodically racked by famine, there is no reason to believe it would refrain from selling weapons-grade nuclear material.

China provides most of North Korea's food and oil supplies and has been instrumental in arranging six-nation talks. It should point to Washington's flexibility as it pressures North Korea to resume talks and give up nuclear weapons in exchange for security and aid.

#### PERSONAL EXPLANATION

#### HON. ELTON GALLEGLY

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, October 28, 2003*

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Speaker, on Tuesday, October 21, I was unable to vote on H. Res. 407, the Rule to provide for consideration of H.J. Res. 73 (rollcall vote 566). Had I been present, I would have voted "yes." I was also